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While monetary policies have been dominated by 
restrictive ‘inflation targeting’ across the world over the last two 
decades, one of the last places to look for progressive economic 
policy has been a central bank. Most commentators would 
have assumed, in effect, that no central bank in the world was 
pursuing a growth-focused mandate.
Yet in Argentina in March 2012, the legislature and the 
president approved a new Ley Organica for the central bank 
that incorporates an unambiguous growth mandate (See http://
jweeks.org).
This is in stark contrast to Argentina’s earlier monetary policies. 
During the 1990s, for instance, the government dedicated itself 
to a neoliberal economic regime, marked most infamously 
by the adoption of a ‘currency board’ monetary regime. The 
currency board tightly tied Argentina’s domestic money supply 
to the central bank’s holdings of foreign exchange.  
This exchange-rate regime included a fixed peg to the U.S. 
dollar, unlimited and unconditional conversion of the national 
currency (the peso) into foreign currencies, and the requirement 
that the central bank’s holdings of foreign-exchange reserves 
be equivalent, at least, to the domestic components of the 
country’s monetary base.
Initially lauded by neoliberal economists as the quintessence of 
a sound monetary policy, this regime imploded spectacularly 
towards the end of the decade. This disaster ushered in a 20% 
fall in national income during 1998-2002. In addition, inflation 
skyrocketed to over 100% in 2002 (See Figure 1). Panicked, the 
government dramatically changed its monetary policies that 
same year.
The Lack of Democratic Input
The example of Argentina’s currency board underscores a central 
characteristic of neoliberal economic regimes: the removal 
of economic policymaking from democratic influence. Such 
regimes advocate monetary policies that are ‘independent’, i.e., 
under the uncontested control of so-called experts.  
For neoliberals, ‘independence’ of central banks signifies no 
political oversight via the democratic process. This differs from 
the ‘soft’ independence of the U.S. Federal Reserve, which 
requires, at least, regular reporting to Congress. An extreme 
case of lack of oversight is found in Indonesia, where the central 
bank enjoys ‘hyper-independence’ (in response to the advice 
of the IMF). In this case, the president could not remove the 
governor, even on the grounds of misconduct.
Neoliberalism’s approval of restrictive monetary policies goes 
hand in hand with the restrictions that it places on the effective 
use of other macroeconomic policies. For example, it preaches 
the necessity of balanced budgets, a stance that removes any 
basis for counter-cyclical fiscal policies. It also endorses ‘flexible’ 
or ‘market-determined’ exchange rates, which undercut the 
possibility of intervening to rationally manage the exchange 
rate.
The general ‘decommissioning’ of macroeconomic policy 
tools is capped off by guaranteeing the ‘independence’ of the 
central bank from political oversight. This extreme insulation 
from the democratic process (epitomized, for example, by the 
dysfunctional European Central Bank) leaves governments very 
few policy instruments with which to pursue any desirable goal 
other than strict controls on inflation.
From Neoliberalism to Social Democracy
The election in Argentina of Nestor Kirchner in 2003 occasioned 
a dramatic shift from neoliberalism to social democracy. This 
change continued and deepened with the election in 2007 of 
Cristina Fernández, and her re-election in October 2011 on the 
basis of almost 55% of the vote.
After 2003 the ensuing change in national economic 
performance proved as dramatic as the shift in the national 
economic regime. After five years of decline, real national 
income grew at an annual average of 7.5% during 2003-2011, 
and inflation averaged slightly less than 10% (see Figure 1).
Figure 1:  Argentina, Growth Rate of Real GDP 
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Though criticized by neoliberals, this rate of inflation was modest 
for post-World War II Argentina. Indeed, it is plausible that the 
structural basis for inflation in Argentina has been reduced by 
this extended growth process, the longest sustained expansion 
in a generation (except for the externally induced dip in 2009 
due to the global crisis).
Though economic policy had changed dramatically in 
Argentina during these recent years, it remained constrained, 
unfortunately, by the legal legacy of the dysfunctional currency 
board. This problem manifested itself in 2010 when the governor 
of the central bank adamantly refused to use foreign currency 
reserves to service the country’s external debt. He argued that 
this action would break the strict rule that the Central Bank 
should hold reserves equivalent to no less than 100% of the 
domestic monetary base. 
Faced with a central bank determined, in effect, to induce 
default on the country’s debt, President Fernández sacked the 
governor, replacing him with Mercedes Marcó del Pont, then 
president of the largest commercial bank in Argentina.
Reforming Monetary Policies
The appointment of a new governor has been accompanied 
by the introduction of a new legal framework for the central 
bank that institutionalizes its ability to implement counter-
cyclical monetary policies. This new law eliminates the strict 
link between the country’s foreign exchange reserves and 
its money supply, which had led invariably to deflationary 
monetary policies.
The importance of this change cannot be over-estimated 
because it provides an enabling environment for rational 
economic policy-making. For example, targeting an explicit 
inflation rate only makes sense when the rate is considered 
to be either a lower boundary (in order to avoid deflation, 
i.e., a general fall in prices) or an upper boundary (to avoid 
destabilizing high inflation).
Argentina’s new stance enables counter-cyclical monetary 
policy to function as a valuable complement to counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy. It also simultaneously enables rational debt 
management, rather than artificially linking national debt to 
the stock of foreign-exchange reserves. This stance also allows, 
of course, the central bank to coordinate its interventions in the 
currency market with the medium and long term development 
policies of the country.  
Additionally, this regime allows for greater flexibility in deficit 
finance. Previously, the currency board rule that linked reserves 
to the domestic monetary base prevented, in practice, any 
monetizing of the deficit (financing of government deficits by 
the central bank). 
Though neoliberals consider monetization to be the ultimate 
policy sin, when it is implemented pragmatically, it opens up 
desirable policy space for the government. For example, in 
the last ten years it has been one of the key tools enabling the 
government of Argentina to avoid having recourse to expensive 
foreign borrowing to cover its fiscal deficits.
But, above all else, the new Ley Organica institutionalizes the 
principle that the function of monetary policy is to help achieve 
long-range development goals, and to coordinate with fiscal 
policy in selecting and prioritizing such goals.  
The Return to Economic Sanity
Forty years ago the coordination of fiscal, monetary and 
exchange rate policy as a basis to facilitate economic growth 
and development was standard practice in both developed and 
developing countries. In 1969, for instance, the Bank of Sweden 
awarded Jan Tinbergen its ‘Nobel Prize’, in part for his famous 
‘Tinbergen Rule’ of policy coordination. 
This rule states that the number of policy instruments used by the 
government must be at least equal to the number of goals that it 
seeks to achieve. For example, while a strict neoliberal monetary 
policy, such as a currency board, is targeted at achieving a low 
inflation rate, it cannot be expected simultaneously to promote 
growth-inducing domestic investment (without coordinating 
with fiscal policies) or an expansion of exports (without 
coordinating with exchange-rate policies). 
Progressives across the world should strongly support the 
Argentinean government for the return to economic sanity that 
is embodied in its new central bank law. The legal formalization 
of the sensible rule that monetary policy should be a positive 
instrument for promoting the general welfare vindicates the 
arguments of many heterodox economists. 
More important has been the government’s reassertion of the 
principle that monetary policies—just like other macroeconomic 
policies—should be subject to democratic oversight. Just as 
George Clemenceau once remarked that “war is too important 
to be left to the generals”, we should re-instate the rule that 
economic policy is far too important to be “left to economists”. 
Experts advise and elected representatives decide: this is called 
“the democratic process”. We can be thankful to Argentineans 
for reminding us that such a rule should apply even to central 
banks.
For further lively discussions of timely 
macroeconomic issues from a heterodox 
perspective please see John Weeks’ website
 and blog: http://jweeks.org
